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Executive summary 
This paper investigates the voluntary disclosure of Intellectual Capital (IC) of British firms 
and provides some evidence on an unexplored area of the literature; that of the 
association of Corporate Governance (CG) with IC disclosure. Inconsistent with 
expectations, the results show that British firms disclose more information about their 
human capital. On the other hand, findings indicate that ownership structure, size and 
industry are important factors in describing disclosure trends of IC which is in line with 
what anticipated. Lastly the outcomes of the study support the notions of Agency theory 
that refer to manager’s opportunism and information asymmetry. 
 
1. Introduction 
During the last decades information age competition started to substitute the traditional 
industrial age competition and inevitably firms started to formulate their strategies in 
order to be up-to-date with the new business environment and the phosphorus 
opportunities of the new era. In line with this change, the users of financial statements 
adjusted their needs for information to the new circumstances that had been emerged 
from this transaction of economical conditions.  
However, the inadequacies of the traditional accounting systems to incorporate the 
requirements of firms have resulted in an information gap between managers and 
stakeholders. A possible solution for this problem is the provision of voluntary disclosures 
through the annual reports of the firms, which will eventually reduce this gap. Thus, 
voluntary disclosures have gained much attention and have been the center of academics 
and accounting legislators during the last years. Apart from the one described above, a 
new problem came into sight and contributed to the increased demand of voluntary 
disclosures; agency costs, which resulted from the separation of the principals from the 
decision-making function of the firms (Fama and Jensen 1983). . Consequently, voluntary 
information which will eventually eliminate the gap between internal and external parties 
has become a necessity. 
The present paper focuses on a particular type of voluntary disclosure, that of IC. Although 
there is not a consistent definition of IC, it is regarded as a type of intangible asset and a 
form of unaccounted capital. Moreover, IC is highly connected with knowledge 
management and it is a sign of competitive advantage, especially in developed economies 
where technological advances and R&D are of great significance. 
Previous studies concerning IC disclosure explored the reporting practices of companies; 
nevertheless IC literature is still developing and more studies will have to be carried out, 
so that to provide a strong background for future researchers. It has to be mentioned that 
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none of the studies concerning IC disclosure incorporates the term of corporate governance 
(CG), despite the fact that in the voluntary disclosure literature CG is described as a 
significant factor influencing disclosures. More specifically it is argued that voluntary 
disclosures are a result of managers’ decisions and that the board of directors is the main 
control mechanism in terms of monitoring the management’s actions. Therefore, corporate 
governance (CG) can be a significant factor in explaining voluntary disclosure patterns and 
academic research shows that determinants of CG, such as board composition and 
ownership structure, are positively associated with the voluntarily provision of 
information. 
This study deals with the description of IC disclosure trends of British listed firms and the 
relationship of CG attributes and other firm’s characteristics with IC disclosure. Moreover 
the main objectives of the research is i) the contribution to the existing literature in terms 
of results and ii) the investigation of an unexplored area of the literature; that of the 
association between IC and CG. 
For this purpose, two different techniques were employed. The first is content analysis, 
which aimed to capture the voluntary disclosure trends based on pre-defined IC categories. 
The second is regression analysis, which was the main tool in describing the relationship 
between measures of CG and other firm’s attributes, and IC disclosure.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Next chapter includes the literature 
review, as well as a review of relevant prior research results. Chapter 3 underlines the 
research objectives and presents the major aspects of the methodology employed. Chapter 
4 describes the results obtained, while chapter 5 discusses these empirical results. Finally, 
Chapter 6 concludes the study, discusses the main problems and limitations of the present 
paper, and provides suggestions for further research. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Theoretical background 
Although Johansson et al. (2001) maintain that IC definitions are connected with various 
theories of the organization, in the literature there is not a common view of which theory 
provides a better understanding of IC disclosure, and thus researchers tend to use different 
approaches in order to perform their studies. This is also proven by the fact that the 
majority of the studies do not provide a clear link between IC reporting practices and 
theoretical approaches. This paper acknowledges this fact and addresses this issue by 
adopting Positivist Agency Theory, as a relevant theoretical background in explaining 
voluntary IC disclosure patterns. 
The paradigm on which the paper chose to base its analysis is the positivistic one, which 
assumes that the IC phenomenon is given and can be understood by dividing it in isolated 
parts and adding knowledge to these parts (Bornemann et al. 1999). This approach includes 
hypothetico-deductive testing (O’Donnel 2004) and is based on the assumption that social 
reality is independent of individuals and exists even if these individuals are not aware of it 
(Collis and Hussey 2003). 
Agency theory states that principals (managers) will provide voluntary information only if 
this action increases their welfare or in other words if the benefits from disclosure are 
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higher than the costs incurred. Additionally individuals may be self-interest-seeking. This 
implies that agents may act to serve their own interests rather than the interest of the 
principals. Hence, managers should try to satisfy and convince shareholders that they are 
not acting for their own-interest by providing voluntary information in the annual reports 
(Eisendhardt 1989). 
The emergence of agency costs and the increased demand for voluntary disclosures are 
two strong incentives for managers to disclose a considerable amount of voluntary 
information. Provision of voluntary information by managers can potentially decrease both 
the information gap between the firm and the stakeholders, and the agency costs arisen. 
As Depoers (2000) argues, widely held firms present higher agency costs, which can be 
controlled and eventually decreased through voluntary disclosure. 
Concerning CG, agency theory suggests that wider ownership is more likely to result in a 
higher level of voluntary information, since wide share ownership can create more 
conflicts between managers and stakeholders (principals and agents). Thus, CG policies 
should be formed in such a way that address these conflicts and potentially reduce agency 
costs. Consequently, CG has a crucial role in addressing the relationship between the firm 
and the providers of finance. In view of the fact that IC reflects the hidden value of the 
firm and it is a an indicator of competitive advantage, the role of CG is of major 
importance in formulating the IC reporting trends, indicating the significance placed on IC 
and revealing the will of managers to provide voluntary information related to IC. 
 
2.2 Measuring intellectual capital 
Within the literature there have been identified several frameworks which are used over 
time in order to classify and measure intellectual capital (Table 1). However, the present 
paper focuses on the framework which is considered to be the most relevant for the 
purposes of the study; Intangible Asset Monitor. This framework for IC measurement was 
the major template for the conduction of the research. Intangible Asset Monitor was 
created by Karl Sveiby (1997), who managed to create an intangible asset monitor (IAM), 
which is regarded as one of the most widely accepted models for understanding and 
reporting on IC. The scholar tried to address this issue, by dividing intangible assets into 
three categories; internal structure, external structure and employee competence. 
 
2.3  Prior research studies 
In the literature there are several studies dealing with the issue of voluntary disclosure and 
its determinants. Meek et al. (1995) showed that size and, to a lesser extent, industry are 
important factors in explaining voluntary disclosures. However, their results vary 
depending on the kind of information. Hossein et al. (1995) proved that size, foreign listing 
status and leverage are considered as important incentives for voluntary disclosure. On the 
other hand auditor and assets are insignificant. Furthermore, Chow and Wong (1987) also 
underlined the strong association between size and voluntary disclosure; nevertheless their 
results do not reveal a significant correlation between leverage and assets, and corporate 
disclosure. In line with the previous findings, Depoers (2000) and Raffournier (1995) 
showed that size as well as internationality of a firm affects the provision of voluntary 
information. Finally, the results of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) demonstrated 
significant relationships between disclosure and size, industry and ownership structure. 
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The present paper acknowledges the results of the above studies and further focuses on 
papers that examine a. the IC disclosure and b. the influence of CG on voluntary provision 
of information.  
 
 
TABLE 1: FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING IC 
 
Developers Framework Classification of IC 
Kaplan and Norton 
(1992) 
The Balanced Scorecard Internal process perspective 
Customer perspective 
Learning and Growth 
Financial Perspective 
Haanes and Lowendahl 
(1997) 
Classification of Resources Competence 
Relational 
Lowendahl (1997) Classification of Resources Competence 
Relational 
Sveiby (1997) Intangible Asset Monitor Internal structure 
External structure 
Employee competence 
Edvinsson and Malone 
(1997) 
The Navigator Human capital 
Structural capital 
Petrash (1996) Value Platform Human capital 
Customer capital 
Organizational capital 
Danish Confederation of 
Trade Unions (1999) 
Three categories of 
knowledge 
People 
Systems 
Market 
Roos et al. (1997) Intellectual Capital Index Human capital 
Infrastructure capital 
Relationship capital 
 
 
2.3.1  IC disclosure 
Empirical studies were performed in several countries to investigate the corporate 
reporting practices on IC and the majority of these studies utilized different IC indicators 
and measurement approaches. The latter fact is rather expected, since both the definition 
and the theory of IC is controversial, as it was previously discussed. The results of the 
studies vary, as far as the content of IC reporting is concerned. On the other hand, the 
majority of the studies reveal a significant relationship between the disclosure amount and 
firm’s characteristics. The findings of the most relevant studies are summarized below. 
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The study of Guthrie and Petty (2000) had a number of imperfections; however it provided 
valuable information to researchers on how to address the crucial issue of IC reporting. 
Findings indicated that IC disclosure was low and Australian firms did not report according 
to an IC framework. Brennan (2001) focused on Irish knowledge-based companies and the 
results showed that companies had substantial IC assets, but they are not measuring these 
assets in an appropriate way. Among the categories, external capital was the most 
reported, followed by internal capital and human capital. The study of Bozzolan et al. 
(2003) revealed that firms pay attention to their external structure, while industry and size 
seem to be relevant factors in explaining the reporting practices. Abeysekera and Guthrie 
(2005) found that companies had increased their IC reporting level and the more reported 
category of the three was external capital, followed by internal capital and human capital. 
Garcia-meca et al. (2005) concluded that the most reported categories of IC are 
customers, strategy and process. On the other hand, firms did not choose to report a big 
amount of information about innovation and R&D. Additionally, the scholars showed that 
the size and the internationality of the firm are positively associated with IC disclosure. 
Guthrie et al. (2006) tried to provide a comparative analysis of IC disclosure in Australia 
and Hong-Kong. Results indicated that Australasian firms did not disclose a high amount of 
information related to IC, while they focused primarily on qualitative data. As it was 
anticipated, size was positively correlated with disclosure for both locations.  
 
2.3.2 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance is highly related to agency theory and its assumptions, since it can 
be defined as a way to protect the shareholders’ interests (Tirole, 2001).  Thus the linkage 
between the problem (agency costs) and the potential solution (voluntary disclosure) is 
how effectively organizations deal with the concept of CG. Within the literature there 
have been identified various determinants of CG, such as ownership structure, board 
composition, managerial ownership, governmental ownership, audit committee and audit 
firms. Regarding the association of CG and disclosure, only few studies have been 
conducted that examine the impact of CG on the extent of voluntary disclosures.  
More particularly, Eng and Mak (2003) examined whether CG measures and other relevant 
factors affect the disclosure of voluntary information. The results showed that ownership 
structure and board composition influence the voluntary disclosure and that lower 
managerial ownership and considerable government ownership are positively associated 
with voluntary disclosure. Blockholder ownership, though, was not a relevant factor in 
describing disclosure trends. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found that two CG measures and 
only one cultural characteristic of firms were associated with voluntary disclosure. Chau 
and Gray (2002) examined the influence of ownership structure of firms on voluntary 
disclosures. The findings showed that more widely held firms disclosed more voluntary 
information, while “insider” or family-controlled firms demonstrated a lower level of 
disclosure. Lastly, Barako et al. (2006) showed that audit committee, board composition, 
foreign ownership and percentage of stocks owned by institutional shareholders are the 
most statistically significant CG measures that influence voluntary disclosure. Among the 
other factors, size and leverage ratio were positively related to the extent of disclosures. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Research design 
The main purpose of this research is to investigate the magnitude of IC disclosure in annual 
reports of British firms and thus the main research question of the paper is: “What is the 
importance placed from British firms on IC?” Furthermore, one main objective is to 
examine the extent of IC disclosure and reveal the significance placed on IC categories, 
while another goal is to identify the association between IC disclosure and CG measures, as 
well as other firm’s attributes.  
 
3.2.1  Coding Process 
The coding process involved reading the annual report of each company and coding the 
information according to pre-defined categories of IC. More specifically, after reading the 
annual report, each sentence was coded based on a numerical scheme: “0” if no 
information was provided, “1” if qualitative information was provided, “2” if quantitative 
information was provided and “3” if information was presented in graphs, tables or figures. 
Additionally this paper focused on information, that was not requested by laws or 
accounting principles and was provided voluntarily by the companies. Same information 
regarding an IC item was not counted more than once. After its identification, each item 
was classified into the three main categories and sub-categories based on key words that 
were the titles of each sub-category (Table II). 
 
 3.2.2 Statistical Models 
The four main categories (Overall IC disclosure, Internal Capital, External Capital and 
Human Capital) were set as the dependent variables for four statistical models (Model 1, 
Model 2, Model 3, Model 4). The models were estimated based on the following equation: 
 
Regression Model: 
iiiiii
iiiiiiiiiii
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a = constant 
b = Coefficients for each variable 
D = Disclosure index (Total Disclosure, Internal capital, External capital, Human capital)  
BC = Board composition (percentage of independent directors in the board of directors) 
OS = Ownership structure (Sum of substantial shareholders, who hold more than 3% of 
ordinary share capital) 
MO = Managerial ownership (Percentage of ordinary shares held by executive directors) 
Ln(TA) = Natural Logarithm of Total Assets (as at 31/12/07) 
ROA = Return on assets 
ROE = Return on equity 
LR = Leverage ratio (defined as Total Assets/Total Liabilities) 
IND = Industry (Dummy Variable; 0 for Financial companies and 1 for non-financial 
companies) 
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1. Employee Relations
2. Employee Related 
Items 
3. Work related 
knowledge and 
competence  
4. Training and 
Development 
“1” for qualitative 
information 
“2” for quantitative 
information 
“3” for figures, tables 
and charts 
1. Intellectual Property 
Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks and Brands 
2. Management Philosophy 
and corporate culture 
3. Information Systems and 
Network Systems 
4. Management Processes 
TABLE II: CODING PROCESS 
 
    Is an IC item included in the sentence? 
 
                      Yes                                         “0” if No 
 
What kind of IC item is it? 
 
 
                Internal Capital   External Capital  Human Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Hypotheses development 
 
Board Composition 
Non-executive directors are a crucial element of the board’s ability to address a potential 
agency conflict (Barako et al. 2006). Hence, higher proportion of non-executive members 
in the board of directors can be a strong incentive for voluntary disclosure. 
 
H1 = IC disclosure is positively associated with the proportion of non-executive members 
in a board. 
 
Ownership structure 
Agency theory underlines that widely held firms are more likely to disclose voluntary 
information due to the effort of managers to prove that they do not act self-centered. 
Thus companies with wide share diffusion are expected to present a higher level of 
disclosure. 
1. External Brands
2. Customers  
3. Distribution Channels  
4. Business 
Collaborations  
5. Company Names  
6. Market Share 
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H2 = IC disclosure is negatively associated with the proportion of shares held by 
substantial shareholders 
 
Managerial Ownership 
Agency costs are more likely to emerge when managerial ownership is low (Eng and Mak 
2003) and thus low managerial ownership is expected to lead to higher disclosure levels 
 
H3 = IC disclosure is negatively associated with managerial ownership 
 
Size 
Large companies undertake more activities and consequently firms need to report more 
information to external parties in order to reduce agency costs. This study utilizes the 
natural logarithm (Ln) of Total Assets as the proxy measure for a firm’s size. 
 
H4 = IC disclosure is positively associated with size 
 
Industry 
Companies were separated in two different groups; financial and non-financial companies. 
In the regression model “Industry” was set as a dummy variable and the first group of firms 
was assigned with “0”, while the second was assigned with “1”.  
 
H5 = IC disclosure is higher for Non-Financial companies 
 
Profitability 
Profitability is regarded as a significant factor from the scope of agency theory, since 
managers of profitable firms tend to use voluntary disclosure as a way to justify their 
position and compensation package (Barako et al. 2006). In the present paper profitability 
is measured with two proxies; ROA and ROE. 
 
H6 = IC disclosure is positively associated with ROA 
 
H7 = IC disclosure is positively associated with ROE 
 
Leverage Ratio 
Finally, leverage ratio is an important factor in corporate reporting, since higher debts 
tend to increase agency costs and hence voluntary disclosure (Meek et al. 1995). Leverage 
ratio is calculated as Total Assets divided by Total Liabilities. 
 
H8 = IC disclosure is positively associated with debt 
 
3.2 Methods Employed 
The first method employed is content analysis, which is a significant tool for gathering 
data through the codification of qualitative and quantitative information into pre-defined 
categories in order to derive patterns regarding the presentation and the reporting of 
information (Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005). The second method, regression analysis, 
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describes the relationship between a quantitative dependent variable and one or more 
independent quantitative variables. In the literature regression analysis is used in order to 
investigate whether various factors are relevant in explaining the amount of IC disclosure.  
 
3.3 Sample 
The final sample consisted of 97 companies, which were listed on FTSE 100 as at 31th 
December 2007 (Appendix I). Three companies (TUI Travel, Thomson Reuters and Carnival) 
were excluded from the sample since they did not provide adequate information about CG. 
The data were gathered mainly by hand, while information about industry and profitability 
was obtained from the official site of LSE15 and Compustat Global respectively. 
It could be argued that the selection of the sample is biased. Nevertheless the majority of 
the previous studies concerning voluntary reporting show that the size of firms is a key 
factor that determines the extent of voluntary information (Gray et al. 1995, Mitchell et 
al. 1995). More particular Gray et al. (1995) mention that a sample consisted of large 
companies is more likely to demonstrate examples of voluntary disclosure, than a similar 
sample of medium or small companies. In addition to this, it has been proved that bigger 
firms tend to disclose more information on their annual reports (Guthrie and Mathews 
1985) and are the pioneers in any improvements in corporate disclosure, due to the 
demanded financial resources that they possess (Andrew et al. 1989). Bigger firms are also 
expected to possess more intellectual capital because they are more noticeable and have 
more resources at their disposal to fund new projects (Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005). Thus 
a sample consisted of large companies is more appropriate, in terms of examining trends, 
identifying innovations and recording voluntary disclosure practices. Therefore, this study 
focuses on the biggest companies listed on the index FTSE-100 of the London Stock 
Exchange, which tracks the performance of the top listed companies ranked according to 
criteria such as market capitalization, liquidity and free float of shares. 
 
3.4 Data Source and Unit of Analysis 
The source of the data was the annual report of each firm for the fiscal year 2007. Annual 
reports are a highly useful source of data, because companies use them to provide helpful 
and important information to account users (Guthrie and Petty 2000). Moreover, annual 
reports give the opportunity to users to make comparisons of management strategies 
across reporting periods, since annual reports are the product of a regulatory procedure 
(Abeysekera 2001; Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005).  
The unit of analysis that should be used in content analysis is a crucial part of this study 
and many papers have highlighted its importance. However, the appropriate unit of 
analysis is a topic highly debated in the IC literature, with words, sentences, paragraphs 
and pages being as the most suitable unit. According to Milner and Adler (1999) words 
contain little meaning without context, while paragraphs and pages have several different 
meanings that are difficult to be coded. Thus, the present paper uses sentences as the unit 
of analysis, so as to ensure that problems related to the use of words, paragraphs or pages 
are overcome and unnecessary unreliability is avoided (Bozzolan et al. 2003). This method 
is supported by many scholars (Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005; Bozzolan et al. 2003; Beattie 
                                             
15 www.londonstockexchange.com 
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and Thomson 2006) because sentences are easily identifiable wholes (Carney 1972) and 
they are preferred when meanings are to be deducted from written data (Gray et al. 
1995). 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Content analysis 
The most reported category of IC was human capital and the most reported sub-categories 
were i) employee related measures, ii) work related competence and knowledge, and ii) 
management philosophy and corporate culture. On the other hand the least reported 
category of IC was external capital and the least reported subcategories were i) external 
brands, ii) market share, and iii) information and network systems. During the research the 
term “intellectual capital” was included to one annual report; nevertheless the company 
that used the term of IC did not provide any relevant information. Regarding the 
categories of IC, all companies disclosed more information about their Human Capital 
which is far the first reported category, followed by Internal Capital and External Capital. 
Detailed descriptive statistics are shown on table III. What is interesting is that out of the 
first ten ranked companies in IC reporting the first is a financial one, while the majority of 
the rest belongs to the non-financial group (Table IV). 
 
TABLE III: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
TABLE IV: TOP 10 COMPANIES ACCORDING TO TOTAL IC DISCLOSURE 
Company Internal 
Capital 
External 
Capital 
Human 
Capital 
Total IC 
disclosure 
Mean 37,4433 30,0619 55,7526 123,2577 
Median 35,0000 27,0000 56,0000 116,0000 
Std. Deviation 17,92052 19,55112 23,33632 46,64053 
Minimum 8,00 2,00 9,00 28,00 
Maximum 101,00 82,00 130,00 242,00 
Company Internal 
Capital 
External 
Capital 
Human 
Capital 
Total IC 
disclosure 
1. HSBC Holdings PLC 60 52 130 242 
2. GlaxoSmithKline 70 81 87 238 
3. National Grid 101 35 80 216 
4. Vodafone Group 54 54 99 207 
5. Rio Tinto 71 18 115 204 
6. FirstGroup 64 55 81 200 
7. SABMiller 49 42 108 199 
8. HBOS 42 82 67 191 
9. Aviva 52 66 69 187 
10. BP 55 24 108 187 
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4.1.1 Overall disclosure 
British companies included on average 123 items that are related to IC items in their 
annual reports; 37 of them refer to internal capital, 30 refer to external capital and 56 
refer to human capital. This means that 52% of the reported IC items are related to 
external capital, 27% to internal capital and 21% to human capital. The most reported sub-
categories were those of “Employee Related measures” and “Management Philosophy and 
Corporate Culture”, while the least reported were “External Brands” and “Information and 
Networking Systems”. 
As far as the companies are concerned, “HSBC Holdings Plc” was ranked first in the Overall 
Disclosure index, followed by “Glaxo SmithKline”, “National Grid”, “Vodafone Group” and 
“Rio Tinto”.  All of the previous firms chose to disclose more information about their 
Human Capital, except “National Grid” which reported a fairly big percentage of Internal 
Capital items. Details of the top ranking companies are shown in Table VI. Finally, the last 
five companies in IC reporting are “Cadbury”, ”Liberty International”, “ENR Corporation”, 
“Lonmin” and “Bunzl”.  
 
4.1.2 Internal capital 
Internal capital is considered as the structural capital which is held inside the company. 
The two most reported sub-categories of internal capital were “Management philosophy 
and corporate culture” and “Management Processes”, representing half of the total 
sentences related to internal capital. On the other hand the category “Information and 
Networking systems” had the lowest marks, although many companies included IT costs on 
their balance sheet. Chart 1 shows the distribution for each internal capital sub-category. 
“National Grid” reported the highest amount of internal capital information, giving 
emphasis on Infrastructure Assets which were assigned with 52 marks. The next ranked 
companies were “Shire” and “AstraZeneca”, which both belong to the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. Finally Bunzl, Eurasian and Liberty International reported the lowest level of 
information with marks 10, 10 and 8 respectively.  
 
4.1.3 External capital 
External Capital, which was the least reported category of IC, refers to relationships and 
value resources that derive from outside the firm. The category with the highest number 
of marks was “Distribution Channels”, while the next two most reported sub-categories 
were “Customers” and “Business Collaborations”. An encouraging sign was that a large 
number of companies included not only sections of “corporate social responsibility” 
reports, but also environmental reports. Of course those companies, which dedicated a big 
part of their annual reports for environmental activities, were mainly companies that their 
operations had an impact on natural resources (Mining, Oil & Gas). The percentages of 
each external capital item are shown in Chart 2. 
“HBOS” was the company with the highest number of reported sentences, followed by 
“Glaxo SmithKline” and “3I Group”. It has to be mentioned that the majority of the first 
ranked companies were financial and this was rather expected since this type of companies 
pay more attention to external business factors.  
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4.1.4 Human capital 
Human Capital has as its focus the employees of the firm and includes areas such as 
education, know-how and entrepreneurial spirit.  This category was the most reported 
among the others, representing almost the half marks of the total IC disclosure. The sub-
category with the highest number of sentences was “Employee Related Measures” followed 
by “Work related Knowledge and Competence”. The category of human capital was also 
the most reported in terms of the number of charts, tables and figures. Chart 3 shows in 
detail the percentages of the reported categories. 
”HSBC Holdings”, “Rio Tinto”, “BP” and “SAB Miller” reported the highest amount of 
information about human capital. All of the previous companies included statements for 
equality in the working sector and gave much emphasis to employee knowledge and 
competence. 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
In order to examine whether CG and firm’s characteristics have a statistically significant 
effect on British firms in terms of IC reporting, four different models were estimated. This 
method assists in examining possible negative or positive associations between the amount 
of IC information disclosure and measures that can affect this amount. In each one of the 
four models, a different dependent variable was set; Overall Disclosure, Internal Capital, 
External Capital and Human Capital. The results are summarized in Table V16 (numbers 
inside the brackets stand for the results of the t-test). 
 
                                             
16 Details about the regression results can be found in Appendix II 
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TABLE V: REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
 
BC = Board composition 
OS = Ownership structure 
MO = Managerial ownership 
Ln(TA) = Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
ROA = Return on assets 
ROE = Return on equity 
LR = Leverage ratio 
IND = Industry 
 
 
5.  Analysis 
 
5.1  Analysis of results 
The results of the present research show that the crucial elements of IC were adequately 
identified and captured by the firms; nevertheless they were not reported within a 
consistent IC reporting framework. This was rather expected since none of the companies 
that were included in the sample had installed IC reporting framework. More specifically 
the term “Intellectual Capital” was mentioned only in one of the annual reports. This 
proves that British firms seem to be unaware of the systematic reporting of their IC assets. 
The high percentage of human capital items indicates that organizations have highlighted 
the importance of their human assets and resources. Guthrie (2001) gives credit to the fact 
that the adequate reporting of human capital can create several advantages for the 
company, such as the efficient allocation of human resources, the identification of gaps in 
 Internal Capital External Capital Human Capital Total IC 
disclosure 
2R  0,262 0,304 0,239 0,371 
Adjusted 2R  0,195 0,241 0,170 0,314 
F statistic 3,912 4,806 3,454 6,489 
Significance 0,001 0,000 0,002 0,000 
Variables:     
BC 0,115(1,144) -0,200(-2,041)* -0,039(-0,394) -0,059(-0,636) 
MO 0,022(0,228) -0,098(-1,043) 0,033(0,339) -0,016(-0,183) 
OS -0,178(-1,749)* -0,233(-2,358)* -0,228(-2,261)* -0,280(-2,894)** 
Ln(TA) 0,236(1,914)* 0,332(2,773)** 0,450(3,680)** 0,455(3,999)** 
ROA 0,007(0,062) -0,044(-0,400) -0,008(-0,073) -0,020(-0,190) 
ROE -0,048(-0,421) -0,005(-0,050) 0,11(-0,097) -0,015(-0,145) 
LR 0,189 (1,544) 0,023(0,197) 0,12(0,097) 0,088(0,781) 
IND 0,401 (3,822)** -0,084(-0,789) 0,309(2,962)** 0,294(3,999)** 
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skills and abilities of employees, and finally public policy benefits. The lower percentages 
of external and internal capital can be the result of the firms’ unawareness and 
inadequaecy to efficiently report information about these items. On the other hand, when 
taking into account the notions of agency theory one could underline that managers are 
acting in an opportunistic way and thus are hiding crucial IC elements. Eitherway, firms did 
dislcose a substantial amount of information about their human capital, which clearly 
shows the importance placed on this aspect of IC. 
Furthermore, the different weight given on IC categories raises questions as to whether 
British firms have evaluated the significance of their IC as a whole. Particularly the 
relatively low percentage of external capital items can be explained as an inadequate 
identification of external factors related to globalization and intense competition. April et 
al. (2003) outlines the importance of external capital in a domestic economy that is 
pressured from globalization and the need for companies to centre their attention on 
external factors for future growth. Additionally, Guthrie (2001) states that the emphasis 
given towards external capital is related with the intense competition, which characterizes 
segmented and fractured markets. Moreover the reason for lower percentages of external 
and internal capital may lie on the fact that managers are concerned with the exploitation 
of such additional information by competitors. Thus IC disclosure may hide risks, even 
though companies have strong theoretical incentives for disclosing IC information. This 
finding can be explained within the fields of Agency Theory, since such actions indicate 
that managers are acting in an opportunistic way and they do not wish to disclose 
information about IC, because it can be used from competitors to increase their 
competitive advantage.  
The results of the regression analysis can be described as partly adequate in explaining the 
factors of IC disclosure, with the models showing relatively weak explanatory power. On 
the other hand all the models present a significant relationship with only one measure of 
CG; ownership structure. In addition to this, a number of other independent factors that 
are further analyzed below are associated with IC disclosure. Independent variables, when 
used together, can reliably predict the dependent variables at a significant level of 1%, 
since the p-values of F-stat for all models are lower than 1% (Dielman 1991). Furthermore, 
R-squared is relatively low for all IC categories, which indicates that the model was not 
properly specified, since the fit of the regression line to the data is considered better, as 
the value of R-squared tends to one (Dielman 1991, 99). In other words, other variables 
which are not being taken into account by this study, can explain a larger amount of the 
variance. However, R-squared is not in such a low level that deters the researcher from 
reaching to a reliable conclusion. 
Managerial ownership (MO) seems to have a negative association with Total disclosure; 
however p-values for t-tests are insignificant and hence we can reject H1. Board structure 
does not affect IC disclosure, with the exception of external capital, where the association 
is significant at 5% level. Thus, although there seems to be a negative association between 
board structure and IC disclosure for the majority of the models, the adverse statement 
cannot be rejected with high confidence (90% or more). This means that British firms 
disclosed information about their IC, regardless of the percentage of non-executive 
directors in the board or the percentage of ordinary shares held by executive directors. 
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This result is inconsistent with the prior studies, in which both variables demonstrated a 
strong association with voluntary disclosure.  
On the other hand ownership structure (OS) demonstrates a negative association for all 
models, which is considered significant at 1% for total disclosure and 5% for the rest of the 
models. This leads us to accept H2 for all models and conclude that higher percentage of 
ordinary shares held by substantial shareholders results in lower amount of IC information 
provided by the firms. In this case there is a consistency between the present paper and 
previous studies.  
As far as the rest of the factors are concerned, profitability does not influence voluntary 
disclosure, since in any case the association can be considered as significant. Thus, we 
cannot accept H6 and H7 with a high level of confidence. Conversely, size seems to have a 
strong association with IC disclosure, as it was expected. All models demonstrate strong 
associations between size and disclosure, with p-values lower 1% for the majority of the 
models. Therefore we can state that big firms tend to disclose more voluntary information 
about their IC. This fact is consistent with all the studies in the literature and, mostly, 
supports the notion of agency theory about information asymmetry and opportunistic 
behavior. On the other hand, debt does not seem to significantly influence voluntary 
provision of IC information, although there seems to be a positive association with the 
dependent variables. Consequently, it is evident that debt is not an incentive for firms to 
disclose non-mandatory information related to IC. Finally industry seems to have a 
significant association with voluntary disclosure with the exception of the second model. 
Therefore we conclude that Non-Financial of the firms disclose a higher amount of 
voluntary information than financial firms. 
 
 TABLE VI: RESULTS OF THE HYPOTHESIS TESTED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
NS - Not Significant 
SS - Statistically significant 
 
 Internal 
Capital 
External 
Capital 
Human 
Capital 
Total IC 
disclosure 
H1 NS SS* NS NS 
H2 NS NS NS NS 
H3 SS* SS* SS* SS** 
H4 SS* SS** SS** SS** 
H5 NS NS NS NS 
H6 NS NS NS NS 
H7 NS NS NS NS 
H8 SS** NS SS** SS** 
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5.2 Comparative Analysis 
As far as content analysis is concerned, comparisons with other studies should not be 
performed in terms of absolute numbers, since the numerical scheme followed by these 
papers is not similar to the method adopted by this study. However, the results can be 
compared in percentages, which depict the general trend of IC disclosure.  
British companies focused on their human capital, which is the most reported category 
followed by internal capital, while the least reported category is external capital. This is 
inconsistent with most of the previous IC studies, which showed that companies paid more 
attention to their external capital. Moreover, these studies also revealed the unawareness 
of companies concerning the understanding of IC. This fact was underlined by the present 
paper which revealed that firms in UK have not implemented a theoretical framework on 
which to report IC.  
Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) argue that the high percentage of external capital reported 
by firms in Sri Lanka stems from the fact that organizations are facing an external 
competition from developed economies where visible brand names are dominant. The 
adverse statement can be also true for British firms since the economy that they operate 
in, which is one of the strongest of the world, does not provide with them with strong 
incentives to report on specific information. This can also be a reason that the “External 
Brand” sub-category is the least reported within the British companies’ sample. 
Guthrie and Petty (2001) attribute the high amount of external capital items reported by 
Australian firms to the rationalization of distribution channels, reconfiguration of firm 
value chains and re-assessment of customer value. However, it seems that British economy 
either has already gone through the economical changes mentioned before or pays less 
attention to these changes since they are not influencing the economy as a whole. 
Finally, Bozzolan et al. (2001) discuss that Italian companies reported a low level of 
information about human capital, because managers were concerned with the potential 
exploitation of such information from competitors. However, it seems that managers of 
British firms place a completely different meaning on human capital and this shows that 
the reporting of IC items is highly attributable to the economic circumstances and the 
corporate reporting background of each country. 
Concerning the measures of CG (ownership structure, managerial ownership and board 
structure) only one seems to be strongly associated with disclosure at 1% significant level. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) also reached the same conclusion in their study for 
Australian firms, while this result is inconsistent with the study of Eng and Mak (2003) who 
showed that ownership structure is not related to disclosure. Hence it is obvious that CG 
affects voluntary disclosure depending on the economic environment of each country. It is 
possible that in more developed countries substantial shareholders of firms have different 
motives for corporate disclosure, than in less developed countries. Moreover, board 
composition and managerial ownership are not affecting disclosure of British firms in 
contrast with the findings of previous studies (Eng and Mak 2003; Chau and Gray 2003; Ho 
and Wong 2001; Barako et al. 2006; Haniffa and Cooke 2002).   
Regarding the other factors, size has a positive association with IC disclosure. This was 
rather expected since all of the previous studies have underlined the association of size 
with IC disclosure (Bozzolan et al. 2003; Guthrie et al. 2006; Bozbura 2004; Garcia-meca et 
al. 2005) and voluntary disclosure in general (Meek et al. 1995; Barako et al. 2006; Chow 
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and Wong 1987; Depoers 2000; Hossein et al. 1995; Raffournier 1995; Schadewitz and 
Blevins 1998). Hence size is the most important factor related to voluntary disclosure. This 
notion is valid for all economies around the world, regardless of the development level of 
each economy. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosure and whether 
measures of CG as well as other firm’s characteristics are associated with the provision of 
IC information. A sample of ninety-seven listed British firms was used and a total number 
of eight factors were set as independent variables in four statistical models. Additionally, 
content analysis and statistical techniques, such as regression analysis, were utilized in 
order to gather the data and establish statistical relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables.  
Findings showed that British firms presented a high level of IC disclosure, although they 
have not implemented a framework on which to report IC. Human capital was the most 
reported IC category, suggesting that British firms not only give more emphasis on the 
human factor but also have identified the major importance of human resources, since 
they are regarded as the driving force of a company and a potential source of sustained 
competitive advantage (Wright et al. 1994). On the other hand the low percentage of 
external capital can be attributed to the small importance placed by British firms on it. 
However the fact that information about important aspects of the organization is not 
disclosed or not disclosed adequately leads us to the conclusion that managers are 
following an opportunistic approach in providing information to stakeholders. Thus the 
firms’ effort to reduce agency costs with the provision of voluntary information has certain 
gaps and insufficiencies, which recycles the agency problem. 
Concerning the outcomes of the statistical methods findings indicated that CG measures do 
not influence IC disclosure, with the exception of ownership structure which showed a 
strong positive association with disclosure in all models estimated. Thus it is evident that 
substantial shareholders are a crucial part in a company’s reporting policy development. 
This finding supports the concept of Agency theory which underlines that widely held firms 
tend to disclose more voluntary information, due to agency problems. Among the other 
factors only size and industry seem to be important in describing IC disclosure trends. 
The results of the present paper present a contradiction when compared to previous 
studies. On one hand, content analysis showed that British firms focused mostly on their 
Human Capital which is totally inconsistent with all studies related to IC. On the other 
hand, the strong association of the majority of the factors that were incorporated by the 
present paper is also supported by previous researchers. Specifically ownership structure 
and size seem to be important factors regardless the economic environment.  
The results of the paper also support the notion of reliability since there seems to be 
strong association between a number of factors and voluntary disclosure. However, as 
Collins and Hussey (2003, 58) mention, a research can be regarded as reliable if it can be 
repeated. At this point several arguments can be raised against the method of content 
analysis since it includes a high level of subjectivity when coding the data. Therefore, to 
ascertain reliability, the researcher conducted his study very carefully and with 
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consistency to the guidelines of previous papers. As for validity, Groves et al. (2004) argue 
that a survey is valid according to the extent to which its findings accurately reflect the 
intended construct. The sample of the present study can be considered at least as 
adequate in describing reporting trends of big British firms and thus the study can be 
considered as valid.  Finally, as far as generalisability is concerned, taking into 
consideration that the sample consists only of the biggest firms in LSE, generalizations 
should be made with caution and care.  
 
 Contribution 
The paper acknowledged the increased significance placed on IC and the importance of CG 
in terms of providing information and tried to present valuable information with the scope 
of contributing to the IC literature, which is still being under development. This 
contribution refers to the results of IC disclosure as well as to the identification of the 
factors that affect this disclosure. Additionally, this study provided evidence about an area 
of IC literature that has not been investigated before and aimed at presenting a picture of 
annual reporting practices and revealing critical issues concerning IC disclosure in UK. The 
importance of the results lies on the fact that English companies are provided with 
significant information about IC reporting trends, enabling them to either improve or 
modify their disclosure practices. Lastly, this paper is concerned to make visible the 
crucial roles for accounting in the English economy, particularly in the field of IC, and 
contribute in the identification process of the competitive advantage in organizations. 
 
 Limitations and suggestions for future improvement 
This research has both theoretical and practical implications. Concerning the highly 
debated topic of the appropriate theoretical approach, the findings of this paper was 
analyzed on the grounds of Agency theory. However, it is possible that an alternative 
approach may yield more comprehensive conclusions. Thus, future studies will have to deal 
with a crucial theoretical dilemma, which demands an in-depth understanding of the 
accounting literature.  
On the other hand, practical implications of this study are mainly related to the content 
analysis. A major issue of content analysis is the subjectivity involved in its methodology. 
This is due to the heavy reliance of the method on the reliability of the coder (Abeysekera 
2006). Reliable data are regarded the data that remain stable during the measuring 
process (Krippendorff 2004). Neuendorf (2002) points out that without the establishment of 
reliability, content analysis measures are uninterpretable. However, she argues that 
reliability is an essential, but not an adequate condition for validity. According to Milne 
and Adler (1999) the estimation of reliability requires the measurement of accuracy, 
stability and reproducibility. Consequently future researchers will need to address this 
issue before carrying out their study by distinguishing the accurate nature of information 
related to IC and judging whether references to IC should be counted as IC items (Beattie 
and Thomson 2006). Other implications of the statistical model are related to the sample 
and the variables. A bigger sample can possibly result in higher accuracy and 
generalisability, while other variables which were not taken into account by this study, 
could explain a larger amount of the variance.  
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Appendix I: Companies 
 
3i Group Friends Provident Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
Admiral Group G4S Royal Dutch Shell 
Alliance Trust GlaxoSmithKline RSA Insurance Group 
Amec Hammerson SABMiller 
Anglo American HBOS Sage Group 
Antofagasta HSBC Holdings plc Sainsbury (J) 
Associated British Foods ICAP Schroders 
AstraZeneca Imperial Tobacco Group Scottish and Southern Energy 
Aviva Innvensys Severn Trent 
BAE Systems InterContinental Hotels Group Shire 
Barclays International Power Smith and Nephew 
BG Group ITV Smiths Group 
BHP Billiton John Wood Standard Chartered 
BP Johnson Matthey Standard Life 
British Airways Kazakhmys (WI) Tesco 
British American Tobacco Kingfisher Thomas Cook Group 
British Energy Group Land Securities Group Tullow Oil 
British Land Co Legal and General Group Unilever 
British Sky Broadcasting Liberty International United Utilities Group 
BT Group Lloyds TSB Group Vedanta Resources 
Bunzl London Stock Exchange Group Vodafone Group 
Cable and Wireless Lonmin Whitbread 
Cadbury Man Group Wolseley 
Cairn Energy Marks and Spencer Group WPP Group 
Capita Group Morrison WM Supermarkets Xstrata 
Carphone Warehouse Group National Grid  
Centrica Next  
Cobham Old Mutual  
Compass Group Pearson  
Diageo Petrofac  
Drax Prudential  
Enterprise Inns Reckitt Benckiser Group  
Eurasian Natural Res Corp Reed Elsevier  
Experian Rexam  
FERREXPO RIO TINTO  
FirstGroup Rolls-Royce Group  
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Appendix II: regression results 
 
Model 1: Internal capital 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,512a ,262 ,195 16,07590 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA 
 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 8087,708 8 1010,964 3,912 ,001a 
Residual 22742,230 88 258,434   
1 
Total 30829,938 96    
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA  
b. Dependent Variable: INTCAP     
 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -12,286 14,232  -,863 ,390 
BC ,173 ,151 ,115 1,144 ,256 
MO ,038 ,166 ,022 ,228 ,820 
OS -,179 ,103 -,178 -1,749 ,048 
LNTA 2,399 1,253 ,236 1,914 ,035 
ROA ,011 ,183 ,007 ,062 ,951 
ROE -,011 ,026 -,048 -,421 ,675 
LR 14,685 9,510 ,189 1,544 ,126 
1 
IND 16,361 4,281 ,401 3,822 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: INTCAP    
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Model 2: External capital 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,551a ,304 ,241 17,03536 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA 
 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 11157,735 8 1394,717 4,806 ,000a 
Residual 25537,893 88 290,203   
1 
Total 36695,629 96    
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA  
b. Dependent Variable: EXTCAP     
 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 23,691 15,082  1,571 ,120 
BC -,327 ,160 -,200 -2,041 ,044 
MO -,183 ,176 -,098 -1,043 ,300 
OS -,256 ,109 -,233 -2,358 ,021 
LNTA 3,683 1,328 ,332 2,773 ,007 
ROA -,078 ,194 -,044 -,400 ,690 
ROE -,001 ,028 -,005 -,050 ,961 
LR 1,985 10,078 ,023 ,197 ,844 
1 
IND -1,606 4,537 -,036 -,354 ,724 
a. Dependent Variable: EXTCAP    
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Model 3: Human capital 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,522a ,273 ,207 20,78531 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 14261,494 8 1782,687 4,126 ,000a 
Residual 38018,568 88 432,029   
1 
Total 52280,062 96    
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA  
b. Dependent Variable: HUMCAP     
 
 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -,805 18,401  -,044 ,965 
BC -,077 ,196 -,039 -,394 ,695 
MO ,073 ,214 ,033 ,339 ,735 
OS -,300 ,133 -,228 -2,261 ,026 
LNTA 5,962 1,620 ,450 3,680 ,000 
ROA -,017 ,237 -,008 -,073 ,942 
ROE ,003 ,034 ,011 ,097 ,923 
LR 1,190 12,296 ,012 ,097 ,923 
1 
IND 16,397 5,535 ,309 2,962 ,004 
a. Dependent Variable: HUMCAP    
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Model 4: Total disclosure 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,609a ,371 ,314 38,63405 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 77484,675 8 9685,584 6,489 ,000a 
Residual 131347,881 88 1492,590   
1 
Total 208832,557 96    
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA  
b. Dependent Variable: TOTDIS     
 
 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 10,599 34,203  ,310 ,757 
BC -,231 ,363 -,059 -,636 ,526 
MO -,073 ,399 -,016 -,183 ,855 
OS -,736 ,247 -,280 -2,984 ,004 
LNTA 12,044 3,012 ,455 3,999 ,000 
ROA -,084 ,440 -,020 -,190 ,850 
ROE -,009 ,063 -,015 -,145 ,885 
LR 17,860 22,855 ,088 ,781 ,437 
1 
IND 31,153 10,288 ,294 3,028 ,003 
a. Dependent Variable: TOTDIS    
 
